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Abstract 
Based on a literature review, this paper addresses the questions under what conditions four 
different types of private parties (manufacturers, purchasers, private regulators, and civil society) 
are more or less likely to have an added value to governmental regulation and how public 
regulatory bodies can further this added value. It appears self-regulation by manufacturers or 
purchasers works better as branches have a more self-evident interest to counter market failure, 
are smaller and more homogenous, have more experience with self-regulation and as self-
regulatory systems are less ambitious (and, hence, can achieve less); private regulators seem to be 
more effective as consumers and purchasers are more willing to pay for quality, as companies not 
only want to obtain certificates in order to improve their market position (‘degree purchasing 
syndrome’) but also to improve the quality of their production processes, and as certifiers and 
accreditors compete with each other on price as well as quality; regulation by civil society seems 
to work better when citizens or interest groups are more powerful in relation to business, are 
better able to balance risks, and are more concerned about companies violating public or private 
norms. Public regulatory agencies can positively influence the conditions determining the added 
value of private parties’ contribution to the regulation of market failure by coordinating, 
facilitating, and intervening. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the literature governance is sometimes defined in terms of the involvement of private parties 
with the realization of public goals, or ‘beyond government’ (Lynn 2012). Conceived of as such, 
governance is contrasted with the situation wherein solely public agencies are involved in the 
realization of public goals. Regulation can be conceived of as an instrument aimed at realizing 
public goals. It then pertains to the conscious and goal-directed attempts to influence behavior, by 
way of rules and the monitoring and enforcement thereof (Black, 2002). Consequently, regulatory 
governance concerns the furthering of public goals by setting, monitoring, and enforcing 
regulations directed at influencing behavior by public and private parties (Silbey 2013: 15). 
Companies are an important target of regulation because their activities can harm the safety, health, 
and wellbeing of employees, consumers, citizens, and their living environment. Four different 
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types of private parties can be involved in the regulation of companies: manufacturers or suppliers 
(first parties), purchasers or customers (second parties), independent private regulators such as 
certification and accreditation bodies (third parties), and civil society, consisting of residents and 
interest groups who do not have a direct economic exchange relationship with companies but who 
nonetheless want to be involved in the regulation thereof (fourth parties) (McAllister 2012). 
 During the last few decades many public regulatory agencies have experimented with 
delegating regulatory tasks and responsibilities to private parties. Besides, private parties have 
interfered with regulation on their own initiative. From a public policy perspective an important 
question is whether involving private parties in achieving socially desirable outcomes has added 
value compared to the counterfactual, i.e. the regulation of business by public agencies only 
(Cafaggi & Renda 2012). From this perspective the answer to this question is evaluated in terms of 
whether the behavior of private regulators is sufficiently aligned with the public interest regardless 
of the extent to which they are able to achieve their own goals. The findings with regard to the 
contribution of different private parties to the governance of companies are often contradictory: 
some studies report positive effects, others negative, and yet others insignificant effects. This 
suggests the added value of regulatory efforts by different private parties is context-bound. 
Therefore, the central questions of this review are under what conditions the four different types of 
private parties are more or less likely to have an added value to governmental regulation and how 
public regulatory bodies can further this added value. The goal is to provide an academic 
contribution to the political debate on the question when it is or is not sensible for public 
regulatory agencies to involve different types of private parties in the regulation of companies. 
I have based this review on a fraction of the available literature only. I have primarily 
focused on studies dealing with the regulation of working conditions, health and safety, and the 
environment. These issues clearly involve public goals. Moreover, I have mainly used qualitative 
case studies for my review, which leaves unanswered the question whether or not the findings of 
these case studies can be generalized to other policy domains and other institutional contexts. This 
choice was unavoidable since systematic comparative studies of regulatory governance are 
virtually non-existent (Van der Heijden 2013). Furthermore, I have primarily focused on studies 
dealing with just one of the four types of private parties involved in the regulation of business. For 
this reason, I will not address the issue of the interaction between different private and public 
parties which often occurs in practice. Besides, I have restricted this analysis primarily to public 
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regulating agencies active on the national level. This implies I have paid scant attention to the 
activities of local and transnational public regulatory agencies. Because of the selectivity of the 
used literature, the limited availability of comparative studies, and the restriction of the analysis to 
the separate role of private parties and to national public regulatory agencies, this review has an 
exploratory character. 
I will subsequently address the conditions influencing the contributions the four types of 
private parties can have on the regulation of business and how public regulatory agencies can best 
influence these conditions. I will finish with conclusions and discussion. 
 
 
First and second party regulation: suppliers, manufacturers, and purchasers 
 
What is first and second-party regulation? 
I deal with first and second party regulation concomitantly, because they can both be subsumed 
under the more general heading of self-regulation. Self-regulation concerns the activities 
companies or purchasers undertake to comply with norms or regulations. First-party regulation is 
conducted by in-house compliance officers who work for professional departments which are 
responsible for the implementation of internal management systems and for the integration of such 
formal systems in the organizational decision processes (Short 2013): 24). Second-party regulation 
is conducted by professionals at a downstream company, referred to as purchasers, who regulate 
company’s upstream suppliers (Lytton & McAllister 2014). Different forms of self-regulation can 
be distinguished varying in the extent to what companies act independently of government. For 
instance, Gunningham and Rees (1997: 365) make a distinction between ‘voluntary self-regulation’ 
– whereby companies set norms and enforce without any governmental interference –, ‘mandated 
full self-regulation’ – whereby government mandates and monitors the management systems 
companies design themselves, and, if necessary, intervenes in order to guarantee the effectiveness 
of such systems –, and ‘mandated partial self-regulation’ – whereby companies either draft or 
design the norms mandated by the government themselves, but not both (for other distinctions with 
respect to self-regulation, see Van der Heijden 2012; Börzel & Risse 2010). 
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What can first and second-party regulation add to governmental regulation? 
Self-regulation is based on the presumption that involving companies in the drafting, implementing 
and overseeing regulations results in regulations that better fit the specific context wherein they are 
applied, are easier adapted to changes, and are legitimized to a larger extent than regulation that is 
imposed and enforced top-down by government (Vogel 2008). Moreover, it is a strategy to give 
companies more responsibility for the prevention of the externalities of their activities. However, 
empirical research has shown contradictory effects of self-regulation on compliance: some studies 
find positive effects, others find negative effects, and yet others find no effects whatsoever (Short 
& Toffel 2010; see also Van der Heijden 2012). Some companies participate in self-regulatory 
systems in order to keep government at bay and to free-ride on the efforts of other companies, 
others make sincere efforts to prevent market failure by participating in self-regulatory systems 
because they consider this to be their societal responsibility, or because they believe it pays off.  
 
What conditions influence the added value of first and second-party regulation? 
These contradictory findings show that the added value of self-regulation to governmental 
regulation is conditional. There is quite some consensus in the literature about what conditions 
play a role (Oude Vrielink 2011; Saurwein 2011; Short & Toffel 2010). 
First, self-regulatory systems are more effective as companies have more experience with 
them. Participating in self-regulatory systems induces companies to perceive them a necessary 
element of the companies’ identity and increases the chance they will believe such systems have 
financial gains (Bernstein & Cashore 2007). 
Second, the likelihood that companies will implement self-regulatory systems increases as 
the minimum standards are lower. In the aftermath of one of the factory fires that has cost the lives 
of hundreds of laborers in Bangladesh during the last year, it was brought to light that one of the 
largest participants in a self-regulatory system – Walmart – had actively resisted an initiative to 
enhance minimum standards for fire prevention in factories because this would increase the costs 
of their products too much (Greenhouse 2012). This means a trade-off exists between the level of 
participation and the level of ambition of self-regulatory systems. 
Third, self-regulation works better as producers perceive a more obvious self-interest in 
preventing market failure (Gunningham 1995). For instance, the aircraft industry has substantially 
contributed to the improvement of safety by means of regulation, because in this sector consumers 
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are potential victims of accidents, powerful elites fly more than average, pilots are well organized, 
and the risk of liability claims is high, while in the maritime industry self-regulation has hardly 
helped to improve safety because sailors are badly organized, insurers buy off risks, passengers are 
powerless, and national conflicts of interest preclude the implementation of international treaties 
(Perrow 1984). 
Fourth, self-regulation has more chance of success as business sectors are smaller and more 
homogeneous. The smaller and the more homogeneous branches are, the easier it is for branch 
associations to counter opportunistic behavior – free-riding – during the implementation of 
voluntary self-regulation (Börzel & Risse 2010: 116). The implementation of ‘ Responsible Care’ 
– the self-regulatory system implemented in the huge and heterogeneous chemical industry sector 
– showed, for example, that small companies free-ride on the efforts of large companies because 
they are less convinced of the importance of self-regulation and find it harder to comply with the 
demands this system poses to their management operations (Gunningham 1995).
1
 
Fifth, a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ helps convincing companies of the necessity to take self-
regulation seriously (Verbruggen 2013: 2). Public regulatory bodies which stimulate self-
regulation because they suffer from a chronic lack of means, often achieve the opposite of their 
goals. After all, the perception that public regulatory agencies are inactive and powerless incites 
free-riding and the neglect of public interests (Short 2013: 30; Börzel & Risse 2010: 118). 
Conversely, high levels of regulatory surveillance by public regulators at both the organizational 
and field level promote the implementation of self-regulation (Short & Toffel 2010). Furthermore, 
the perception that the implementation of governmental regulation is looming, has proven to be an 
important reason for business to participate in voluntary self-regulation (Borck & Coglianese 
2012). A ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is needed more when companies are not prepared to comply with 
laws or private norms than when they lack the skills or the authority to do so, although a lack of 
skills or authority often also indicate political unwillingness (Short & Toffel 2010). In sum: an 
active, supportive role of public regulatory agencies contributes to the effectiveness of self-
regulatory systems (Short & Toffel 2010; Saurwein 2011). 
Hsueh and Prakash (2012) have shown that public regulatory agencies in the United States 
use different ways of actively supporting companies to participate in self-regulation. They 
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 Conversely, self-regulation offers powerful market parties the opportunity to exclude less powerful manufacturers 
from the market by implementing rules the latter cannot meet (Krawiec 2003). 
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distinguish between tangible and less tangible forms of support. Tangible forms of support consist 
of giving legal or technical advice about the norms to be applied. Less tangible support consists of 
creating a positive image of companies that voluntarily participate in self-regulatory systems. 
Hsueh and Prakash have demonstrated that public regulatory agencies operative at the state level 
primarily give tangible information in terms of expertise, advice and information, while federal 
regulatory agencies predominantly give intangible support by naming companies that voluntarily 
participate in self-regulation. The reason for this difference is that federal regulatory agencies are 
able to offer companies a huge platform, while national regulatory agencies are knowledgeable of 
local economies, which is useful for companies. This means that the manner in which public 
regulatory agencies offer active support to companies participating in self-regulation depends on 
their resources. 
Public regulatory agencies acting as backstops for self-regulatory systems, providing 
resources, or endorsing these systems engage with compliance officers or managers located at the 
interface where regulations meet the unruly materials they are intended to govern. This 
engagement between public regulators and personnel responsible for self-regulatory systems is 
often accompanied by negotiation and flexibility. The latter often use the advice or pressure of 
external bodies as leverage to implement changes within their own organizations. Internal 
professionals often must adapt an active role, wrangling both the regulations and those being 
regulated to bring them in a workable alignment (Heimer 2013). This means public regulators and 
business professionals often co‐construct regulation and compliance. This process of regulatory 
meaning co‐construction, involves alignment and disputes between regulators’ and professionals’ 
strategic framing of regulatory concerns with tangible consequences for the enactment of 
regulation (Gilad 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
The literature shows that the more public regulatory agencies use self-regulation as a substitute for 
governmental regulation, the less they can perform the active, supportive role that is necessary for 
effective self-regulation. After all, time and again, it has been shown that self-regulation in the 
literal sense has small chance of success, while it can be effective when it complements a robust 
system of governmental regulation (Short & Toffel 2010: 30). The less willing companies are to 
comply with official rules or private norms the more an active role of public regulatory agencies is 
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needed. Apart form monitoring and enforcing self-regulatory systems by public agencies, giving 
legal and technical advice about the norms to be applied and giving positive exposure to 
companies that participate in voluntary self-regulatory systems have proven effective. So, even 
when the right conditions for self-regulation are present, an active, engaged role of public 
regulatory agencies remains necessary. 
 
 
Third-party regulation: Certification en accreditation 
 
What is third-party regulation? 
Third-parties can be called upon to test or to certify. For this, they are being paid by the companies 
they inspect. Private regulators control whether products, processes, systems, or employees comply 
with certain norms. These norms are set by experts in national or international settings, such as the 
‘International Organization for Standardization’ (ISO). These experts come from organizations, 
professional associations, societal interest groups, governmental agencies, or certifiers themselves. 
The norms certifiers inspect can either pertain to voluntary or legally binding norms and 
companies can either hire private regulators voluntarily or are legally obliged to do so. Certifiers 
do not have the same authorizations as public regulators when it comes to applying administrative 
or criminal sanctions for norm violations, not even when they inspect legally binding norms and 
when companies are required by law to hire private regulators. However, private regulators are 
allowed, for example, to withhold or withdraw a certificate. Private regulators themselves are 
controlled by accreditors. Accrediting bodies test whether private regulators are competent to test 
or to certify. Accreditors are hired to do so by the certifiers they control. Accreditors can consist of 
national agencies, such as the Dutch Board for Accreditation (‘Raad voor Accreditatie’), or 
transnational agencies, such as the ‘International Accreditation Forum’ (IAF). 
 
What can third-party regulation add to governmental regulation? 
Similar advantages ascribed to first and second-party regulation are also ascribed to third-party 
regulation (i.e. flexibility, legitimacy, self-responsibility by business). Furthermore, allegedly, in 
comparison to first and second party governance, third-party governance has the additional 
advantage of developing norms that transcend individual companies or branches and, therefore, to 
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provide better opportunities to standardize and harmonize. Another advantage particularly 
attributed to third-party regulation is that it supposedly offers governments extra opportunities to 
manage products and processes that cross borders and, hence, jurisdictions. After all, many 
certifiers are active in different countries and use transnational norms. 
However, in practice the advantages concerning flexibility, legitimacy, and harmonization 
do not always occur. This applies to the whole policy cycle ranging from agenda setting, designing, 
implementing, and evaluating and adapting norms. Agenda setting and designing norms are 
sometimes problematic because the experts who participate in this decision-making process often 
represent different organizations with conflicting interests (Van Erp & Verberk 2004). For 
accreditors that originate from different countries and that have to deal with different jurisdictions, 
it is difficult to agree about the criteria they use to evaluate certifying bodies. Boiral (2012) has 
shown that the implementation phase has a highly symbolic and bureaucratic character resembling 
what in education is called the ‘degree-purchasing syndrome’. This syndrome means that students 
are more focused on obtaining a diploma than on the knowledge the diploma represents, just like 
organizations are more focused on obtaining a certificate than on improving the quality of their 
production processes. An element of this syndrome is that private regulators occupy themselves 
more with controlling documentation than with controlling the implementation practice 
(McAllister 2012: 44). Private regulators often specialize in inspecting compliance with 
administrative requirements, it is faster, and it is easier:
2
 ‘In fact, for auditors, documentation 
represents a stable, standardized, predictable and reassuring element reinforcing the procedural 
aspect of auditing’ (Boiral 2012: 646). The last phase of the policy cycle, which concerns the 
evaluation and adaptation of norms, frustrates the assumed advantages of certification in 
comparison with governmental regulation because private regulators are easily offended when 
criticized, hence react defensively to such criticism, and are inclined to keep their operations secret 
for their competitors (Zwetsloot et al. 2011a; Boiral 2012). 
Not only do the advantages attributed to third-party regulation in comparison to 
governmental regulation often not occur, disadvantages can also be related to private regulation. 
The most obvious risk ascribed to private regulation is that third-parties are more inclined than 
public regulators to adjust their own norms to those of the actors they inspect (‘capture’). The 
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 This inclination of focusing on administrative duties particularly applies to private regulators that control 
governmental regulations because they can use checklists to account to public regulatory agencies (McAllister 2012). 
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reason for this is that public regulators fulfill a public task, while certifiers and accreditors are 
commissioned by their clients. As a result, third-parties perceive themselves less as external 
inspectors whose task it is to detect norm violations and to enforce them and more as business 
partners paid to give advice on how clients can best apply the norms (Boiral 2012: 648/9; Lytton 
2013; WRR 2013: 51). The dependence of private regulators on their clients can result in a 
situation wherein they do not or not sufficiently enforce norm violations – ‘attachment bias’. 
An infamous example of this concerns a salmonella outbreak in the United States causing 
nine casualties and 22.000 sick people. Right before this outbreak a certifier had scored the 
responsible Peanut Corporation of America ‘excellent’ for food safety, while in the aftermath of 
this outbreak public inspectors found dead rodents, holes in roofs, and puddles of stagnant water in 
two factories (Weise 2010).
3
 However, whether or not third-parties are pressured to compromise 
their own norms, depends on their clients. After all, in the end third-party regulation is what clients 
want it to be: an instrument to improve ones market position, an instrument for quality 
improvement, or a combination of the two (Boiral 2012: 652). As such, the question whether or not 
third-party regulation contributes to public goals is context-bound, just as first and second-party 
regulation are. 
 
What conditions influence the added value of third-party regulation? 
Lytton (2013a) has derived five factors contributing to the high effectiveness of subsequently a 
certifier of fire protection and of kosher food. 
The first factor concerns the willingness of consumers and purchasers to pay for 
independent product tests and audits. This explains, for example, also to a large extent why the 
certificate for durable wood inspected by certifiers that are accredited by the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) are much more prevalent in the rich western world than in Africa and Asia where 
the largest part of the production and consumption of rainforest wood take place (Forrer & Mo 
2013). Since consumers and purchasers in Africa and Asia are hardly prepared to pay extra for 
certified wood products, wood traders in those areas lack the incentive to solely sell certified wood 
and since the demand for certified wood is low, wood croppers are not rewarded for their efforts to 
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 Also in our own country a test commissioned by the former Inspectorate of Work and Income brought to light severe 
shortcomings to cranes approved by certifiers (Zwetsloot et al. 2011b). 
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obtain a certificate. Hence, according to Forrer and Mo (2013: 275), it is of no use to start with 
certification when there is no demand for this among consumers or purchasers. 
The second factor concerns the mutual interdependence of parties who realize that their 
reputation depends on the functioning of their certificate. In case of the certification of fire 
prevention the precision of the height of the insurance premium depended on the reliability of the 
certification, while the added value of the certificate for business depended on the lower insurance 
rate that went along with it (Lytton 2013: 25). 
The third factor concerns the co-existence of several certifiers that not only compete with 
each other on price but also on quality. This mutual competition urges certifiers to invest in 
professional training, codes of conduct, internal quality controls, and transparency. 
The fourth factor is that the market is dominated by a few major certifiers. This facilitates 
the coordination and enforcement of norms. This factor explains, for example, why the ISO-norm 
14001 for environmental protection has a lower participation level in the United States than in the 
European Union (Provost 2012). After all, in the United States private standard setting 
organizations are fragmented, compete fiercely, and share norms, results, and practices only with 
paying customers. In Europe private standard setting organizations more often operate under the 
umbrella of a central international organization and are more prepared to exchange standards. 
Consequently, in Europe standards diffuse more easily and new standards are more easily adapted 
to existing ones. 
The fifth factor concerns the existence of a core of active and vigilant consumers who 
provide additional control, who give feedback on control, and who can initiate effective consumer 
bans. This factor has played a crucial role in the success of the certification of kosher food (see 
also Lytton, 2013b). Around eight percent consume kosher food out of religious conviction. This 
category of consumers often discovers problems and puts them on the agenda. It also diffuses 
warnings of certifiers via its own social networks. This proactive hard core of Kosher food 
consumers keeps certifiers to their toes. In order to keep their image as reliable certifiers, they are 
eager to solve problems, to inform consumers, and to pressure manufacturers to withdraw products 
from the market if something is wrong with them. 
This implies the more consumers or purchasers are prepared to pay for quality, the more 
effort companies will make to comply with private norms and the more likely they are to hire 
private regulators that not only compete on price but also on quality. The more private regulators 
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compete on quality, the more inclined they are to develop a clear code of conduct and to 
professionalize. Finally, the more critical consumers and purchasers are, the more vigilant and 
transparent private regulators are. 
 
What can public agencies do to enhance the added value of third-party regulation? 
Public regulating agencies often take into account the risk that private regulators sacrifice their 
goals to those of their clients – ‘capture’. However, the measures that public regulators 
subsequently take to prevent this risk can result in what is called ‘reversed capture’ (Van Erp et al. 
2004; Evers 2004; Martinez et al. 2013: 245). This means that public regulatory agencies impose 
their own goals on private regulators. ‘Reversed capture’ can occur, for instance, when public 
regulators set higher limits to the acceptance of private regulators than they do when it comes to 
their own performances (Verbruggen & Havinga 2014). Reversed capture also occurs when public 
regulators force private regulators to function as their extension by making private inspection 
mandatory, as has happened in the Netherlands, for example, with respect to the regulation of 
cranes, asbestos removal, and health and safety. The consequence of making private regulation 
mandatory is that well-intended companies can no longer distinguish themselves on quality from 
those companies who just want to acquire a certificate to gain entrance to a market. Consequently, 
making private regulation mandatory encourages companies to hire certifiers in order to get advice 
about how to obtain a certificate with minimal efforts (Zwetsloot et al. 2011b). This means public 
regulatory agencies have to try to ply between the risk of ‘capture’ and of ‘reverse capture’. 
One way public regulators can do this, is by enlarging the demand for certified products 
they have faith in. For example, as regards wood crop and sea fishery, public procurement and 
subsidies have proven successful instruments for increasing the demand of products meeting the 
criteria set by governments (Gulbrandsen 2012).
4
 The privileged treatment of governments to 
certifiers meeting their quality criteria induces competing certifiers to comply with those criteria as 
well. As a result, procurement and subsidy measures set in motion a process of ‘trading-up’. 
A second way for public regulators to ply between the risks of ‘capture’ and ‘reverse 
capture’ is by functioning as a backstop for private regulators (Verbruggen 2013: 14). This 
happens, for example, in the inspection of food chains and advertisement texts. In these sectors 
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 EU regulation prohibits governments to prescribe specific certifications, but instead allows the prescription of 
specific quality criteria (Scheltema 2014).   
  
12 
private inspectors deal with simple cases; they pass on complex or contested cases to public 
regulators. This implies public regulators operate as ‘gorilla’s in the closet’; they intervene when 
the expertise or authority of private regulators reach their limits. This form of collaboration offers 
private regulators the authority they need to engender compliance, while it offers public regulators 
the opportunity to determine where the allocation of their scares means remains necessary and 
where it can be missed. A study into the maritime industry has shown that this form of cooperation 
can also limit the risk of companies searching for the cheapest and most lenient private regulators 
(Breukers & Van Gestel 2004). After all, ship-owners are inclined to hire stringent private 
regulators – (‘klassebureaus’) – because they think stringent private regulators are more successful 
in preventing the Maritime Inspection from sanctioning rule violations than lenient ones are. 
According to Verbruggen (2013), public regulators can only act effectively as ‘gorilla in 
the closet’ when four preconditions are met. First, sufficient overlap must exist between the norms, 
goals, and interests of public and private regulators. Second, public regulators should only 
collaborate with professional private regulators that are accredited. Third, private regulators should 
focus on evident, more or less innocent, and easy to solve norm violations, while public regulators 
should focus on the complex, fraud sensitive violations, which can have serious consequences.
5,6
 
Fourth, public and private regulators ought to exchange their knowledge of procedures, working 
practices, and the results of their inspection efforts (see also Martinez et al. 2013).
7
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 However, a study into the regulation of working conditions of Brazilian cane workers has shown that this form of 
complementarity between public and private regulators can even occur without any coordination whatsoever 
(Coslovsky & Locke 2013). After all, the labor inspection deliberately kept its distance to private regulators. Still, each 
in their own way, both types of regulators have contributed to the amelioration of the working conditions of cane 
workers. The labor inspection has succeeded in decreasing excesses with respect to outsourcing chopping labor by 
stringently enforcing official regulations, while middle managers have used the consults of private regulators to 
improve the working conditions at cane plantations. 
6
 This precondition is not unproblematic. After all, it is based on the presumption that public regulators have sufficient 
expertise and personnel to be able to oversee such complex and contested rule violations, while in fact this is precisely 
what is often missing in practice (Breukers & Van Gestel 2004). 
7
 The last precondition is not without its problems either. After all, as a result of the so-called ‘transparency paradox’, 
companies are less willing to provide information to private regulator that pass on this information to public regulators 
that can sanction rule violations than to private regulators that keep this information to themselves (Breukers & Van 
Gestel 2004). In other words, the transparency paradox implies that private regulators are better able to detect norm 
violations as companies provide them with more information, while the willingness of companies to provide such 
information decreases as public regulators act more punitively based on such information (Svatikova 2011). The fact 
that public audits can be used in the United States to sue companies while it cannot in the EU, partly explains why ISO 
14001 has reached a lower participation level in the United States (Provost 2012). 
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Conclusion 
In summary, it can be stated that private regulators run the risk of being captured by their clients. 
This risk is smaller when critical consumers or purchasers press companies to improve the quality 
of their products and to hire private regulators that not only compete on price but also on quality. It 
is larger when consumers or purchasers are not prepared to pay extra for quality and when 
companies hire private regulators that only compete on price and that primarily advice companies 
on how they can obtain a certificate with the least amount of effort. When public regulatory 
agencies take over the control of regulation and private regulators simply act as an extension of 
public regulators, both forms or regulation can no longer complement each other – ‘reverse 
capture’. Hence, public regulators ought to try to ply between the risks of ‘capture’ and ‘reverse 
capture’. They can do this, first, by stimulating the demand of their preferred certified products. 
Second, they can primarily act as backstop for private regulators by focusing on the complex and 
controversial cases, while leaving the simpler and less controversial cases to private regulators. 
However, public regulators can only function effectively as ‘gorilla’s in the closet’ when public 
and private regulators share more or less the same goals, coordinate their activities and exchange 
information, and when public regulators possess enough expertise and authority to intervene in 
complex and controversial cases passed on to them by private regulators. 
 
 
Fourth-party regulation: citizens, consumers, and NGO’s 
 
What is fourth-party regulation and what can it add to public regulation? 
Public regulatory agencies can also involve fourth-parties in the regulation of companies. Fourth-
parties can consist of individual citizens and non-governmental organizations who demand 
companies to act socially responsible. A study into anti-cartel regulation among Australian 
companies has shown that although companies worry about the way stakeholders react to 
companies dodging anti-cartel regulation, this does automatically imply they will comply with 
regulation (Nielsen & Parker 2009). This shows it is not self-evident that involving fourth-parties 
in regulation is effective. 
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What conditions influence the added value of fourth-party regulation? 
First, companies ought to perceive fourth-parties a force to be reckoned with. When citizens or 
interest groups can pose a serious risk to the reputation of companies, companies can be inclined to 
take their demands into account. This is what happened, for example, in the case of blood 
diamonds, wherein the entire international market for diamonds was about to receive a serious 
blow because the feel good aspect of diamonds was threatened by the clever addition of ‘blood’ to 
diamonds. It also happened when Shell decided to dismantle the off-shore platform ‘Brent Spar’ on 
land instead of sinking it in the ocean (Vogel 2005). Companies’ often take the initiative to involve 
residents and NGO’s in regulation by inviting them to start a dialogue about corporate social 
responsibility. On the one hand, this offers fourth-parties the opportunity to influence company 
policy directly. On the other hand, accepting this invitation entails the risk of being coopted. After 
all, a dialogue offers companies the chance to determine where and when communication takes 
place and to define the dialogue in terms of a partnership that ought to create win-win situations, 
which keeps measures off the agenda that forces companies to invest in their environment without 
getting anything in return (Mayes et al. 2012). Hence, on the one hand, it becomes more difficult 
for fourth-parties to carry out a critical vision on the self-evident importance of economical growth 
and to choose a confrontational strategy in their approach of companies, while, on the other hand, 
avoiding dialogue can cause self-marginalization.
8
 
Second, fourth-parties ought to be motivated to come into action. They are more inclined to 
do so when they perceive rule violations as conflicting with socially accepted norms. This outrage 
was absent, for example, when the Dutch Financial Authorities published the names of companies 
convicted for cartelization. These forms of ‘naming’ and ‘shaming’ did not cause a media hype, no 
customers ran away, and the financial sector did not perceive the penalized cases as meaningful 
and norm setting, but as trivialities and food for technicians (Van Erp 2009). Fourth-parties are 
also less willing to come into action in case of invisible risks than in case of visible risks. For 
instance, residents more often complain about odor than about less visible forms of pollution 
(Thornton et al. 2003; see also Meĳer 2008), or they play down invisible risks and blame 
themselves for not escaping them (Auyero & Swistun 2009). Journalists also have incentives to 
                                                 
8
 Residents and local NGOs are faced with a comparable dilemma when dealing with International NGO’s (INGO’s). 
On the one hand, INGO’s can provide financial means, expertise, and legitimacy. On the other hand, relationships with 
INGO’s can make it more difficult for local interest groups to put pressure on companies by organizing protests and to 
remain in touch with local problems (Beer et al. 2012). 
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emphasize egregious wrongdoing and large-scale system failure – both of which make for more 
newsworthy stories that validate the self-images of journalists as protectors of the broad public 
interest  – and this may produce incomplete or insufficiently nuanced analyses (Lytton & 
McAllister 2014, Brants 2008). NGO’s take into account the expected results of their actions: 
‘NGO’s are selective in the causes they champion, depending less on the absolute scale of the 
problem than on how well it fits with dominant frames about blame, opportunities for media 
attention, and the organization of advocacy networks' (Beer et al. 2012: 327). For instance, 
Greenpeace aimed her campaign at Shell, but not against the more unknown Exxon, that was co-
owner of the Brent Spar oil platform (Vogel 2005). 
This implies fourth-parties are most inclined to get involved in regulation of companies 
which generate visible risks which violate socially accepted norms. Their actions are more likely to 
be effective as fourth-parties are more powerful in relation to the companies they try to influence. 
 
What can public agencies do to enhance the added value of fourth-party regulation? 
Two studies on very different policy domains show that without a facilitating, coordinating, and 
intervening government, fourth-parties effective involvement in regulation is highly unlikely. 
Gunningham (2009) has studied under what conditions it is or is not possible to effectively 
involve civil society in environmental regulation. In order to do so, he has compared three 
initiatives in Australia. First, the involvement of the local community with establishing and 
monitoring environmental improvement plans. Second, involving polluters as well as residents in 
the regulation of complex, neighborhood related environmental issues. Third, the involvement of 
parties on different administrative levels in the regulation of natural resources. In the first initiative, 
government was allowed to intervene when collective goals were not achieved or when the local 
parties involved were unable to reach an agreement – in other words: ‘bargaining in the shadow of 
the state’. This initiative resulted in improved environmental results as well as increased trust in 
the factory by the local population. The second initiative was ineffective because collaboration of 
the parties was based on voluntariness and because the government possessed insufficient means to 
apply sanctions and to impose collaboration. The effects of the last initiative were not crystallized 
yet, but here the federal government possessed strong financial incentives for collaboration and to 
withhold subsidies when goals were not reached. 
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According to Gunningham (2009), his comparative case study shows that active 
interference by government is a necessary precondition for success and that success stays away 
where governmental interference is wanting. Amongst others, government ought to describe and 
define the conditions of collaboration – ‘definitional guidance’, give positive incentives for active 
participation in networks and negative for not participating – ‘participatory incentives’, and to 
intervene when goals are not achieved – ‘enforcement capability’. Gunningham concludes that 
government ought to be a primus inter pares in devolved networks: ‘As we have seen, many of 
these roles are absolutely central to the success of new governance initiatives and it seems doubtful, 
at least from these case studies, whether the state can now be regarded as simply one amongst a 
number of actors, all of whom might be analysed “in more or less similar ways in terms of power, 
interests, responsibilities, accountabilities and resources”’ (Gunningham 2009: 165/6). 
Terpstra (2009) has studied the functioning of security networks which have developed 
from the 1980s onwards in the Netherlands. Apart from the police and municipalities, citizens, 
housing associations, social work, youth care and parole workers often also participate in these 
security networks. Many of these networks are created as a result of personal initiatives and remain 
dependent on those initiatives. Because of the informal nature of most security networks, they 
differ as to goals, structure, composition, practices, and magnitude. In practice such security 
networks are often only viable when municipalities and particularly the police visibly support 
citizens. Most citizens only dare to address residents when they believe the police will support 
them when danger arises and when the police is able to tackle free-riding. 
This implies security networks cannot function well without the specific expertise, effort, 
support, symbolism, and backup force of the police. According to Terpstra (2009), the importance 
of the support of informal control by formal control at the level of the municipality is insufficiently 
acknowledged by advocates of security networks. He considers it naive to assume that private 
parties will more or less automatically contribute to public security as public good. Therefore, he 
also believes it a mistake to conceive of government as simply ‘one node among many’. 
Furthermore, according to him, most proponents of security networks underestimate the still 
existing inequalities between public and private parties who are involved in security networks. 
This is exemplified, for example, by fear of aggression by civil servants, by high expectations of 
residents of the police, and by the conviction that maintaining order is still primarily the 
responsibility of the police.  
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Conclusion 
We have seen that as citizens and interest groups are more powerful, better able to balance risks, 
and have a stronger developed sense of norms, they are more likely to play a significant role in 
regulation. However, even when citizens and interest groups possess these characteristics, public 
regulators are still indispensable in defining, facilitating, and steering the manner in which citizens 
and interest groups are involved in regulation. Therefore, it is necessary that public regulators 
occupy a dominant position in terms of power, interests, responsibilities, accountabilities, and 
resources when they collaborate with citizens and interest groups. 
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
We have seen, first, that different conditions influence the contributions that companies, 
purchasers, private regulators, and civil society can make to regulation. It appears that self-
regulation by companies and purchasers works better as branches have a more self-evident interest 
to counter market failure, are smaller and more homogenous, have more experience with self-
regulation and as self-regulatory systems are less ambitious (and, hence, can achieve less); 
certification and accreditation seem to be more effective as consumers and purchasers are more 
willing to pay for quality, as companies not only want to obtain certificates in order to improve 
their market position but also to improve their production processes, and as certifiers and 
accreditors not only compete with each other on price but also on quality; regulation by fourth 
parties seems to work better when these parties are more powerful in relation to business, are better 
able to balance risks, and are more concerned about companies violating public or private norms. 
Apparently, public regulatory agencies can actively manipulate the conditions influencing 
the contribution of companies, purchasers, private regulators, and civil society to regulation. They 
can provide tangible and intangible support to the implementation of self-regulatory systems; they 
can stimulate their preferred products via subsidies and procurement policies; they can act as 
backdrops for private regulators; and they can positively influence the participation of citizens and 
interest groups by describing and defining the terms of collaboration, by incentivizing participation 
and disincentive non-participation, and by intervening when goals are not met. 
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This overview can help public regulatory agencies to determine under what conditions it is 
more or less sensible to delegate responsibilities for regulation to other societal actors and what 
they can do to positively influence these conditions. However, apart from effectiveness, in terms of 
the value added by involving non-governmental actors in regulation, there are other important 
criteria involved in the choice between public and private regulation. Another important criterion is 
legitimacy. The governance model enables parties to exert direct influence on the regulation 
process without the obligation to account politically for it (Lynn 2012). This entails the danger that 
powerful parties influence the regulation process disproportionately and that private interests take 
precedence over public goals, which raises questions as to how legitimate such a regulation 
process is in terms of equality, freedom, and justice and how it can be accounted for (Black 2008). 
These doubts about legitimacy can make the choice for private regulation less appealing, even 
when the preconditions to do so effectively are present.
9
 Moreover, considerations of efficiency are 
also important when choosing between different forms of regulation. For example, for years 
developing countries have stopped the implementation and tightening of international treaties with 
respect to harvesting rainforests and child labor by invoking free trade agreements. This 
counteraction has incited both NGO’s and national governments to stimulate private regulation 
because this made it possible to circumvent free trade agreements (Bartley 2003). Efficiency 
considerations have also played a significant role in the rise and fall of voluntary environmental 
self-regulation in Germany from the 1980s onwards (Töller 2013). In the 1980s and 1990s self-
regulation was popular in Germany because this made it possible to avoid the uncertainty that was 
connected to the testing of national legislation by the European Union, while its popularity 
decreased from 2000 onwards because as a result of the harmonization of the environmental 
legislation the uncertainty connected to the testing of national legislation by the European Union 
decreased, while the voluntary self-regulatory arrangements were legally not binding for the 
European Union. This means that in these instances, efficiency determined the popularity of 
private regulation in comparison to public regulation to a larger extent than effectiveness. 
In sum, under particular conditions, companies, private regulators, or citizens and interest 
groups can effectively contribute to the regulation of market failure, just like public regulators can 
positively influence these conditions. However, public regulators also have to take into account 
                                                 
9
 Whereby one cannot assume that public regulation per definition is more transparent, accountable, and leaves less 
room for private interests. After all, it also happens that powerful lobbying by companies largely determines the 
legislative process (Wagner et al. 2011). 
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other criteria than effectiveness when choosing between public and private regulation and may feel 
the pressure to delegate responsibilities for the regulation of market failure even though the 
necessary conditions to do so are absent, as a result of the self-evidence the turn to governance has 
assumed within the neoliberal political climate of the last few decades (Van Waarden 2012; Van 
der Heijden 2013).  
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